By Pradeep S. Mehta, Madhvendra S. Panwar
When India opened its civil aviation sector to greater private participation, the promise was straightforward: more competition, better services and greater choice for consumers.
A report in 2009 by CUTS on regulation and competition in civil aviation had advocated the opening of India’s closely held market. But the entry of more players may not automatically translate to effective competition or improved consumer welfare. What matters is whether market arrangements and efficient functioning of the airlines actually benefit the market.
That question has returned in a new form. If an airport operator is also permitted to own an airline, could it bring fresh investment and competition to the Indian aviation sector, or provide an advantage over the very airlines that depend on its infrastructure?
There is a useful parallel with banking. Under the Reserve Bank of India’s 2016 guidelines for licensing universal banks, large industrial houses are not eligible to promote a bank, although they may invest up to 10% in one. The approach correctly reflects concerns about conflicts of interest, connected lending and the concentration of economic power.
The analogy is not exact: banking and aviation have different risks and regulatory frameworks. But the underlying principle is relevant to both, when a business controls an important gateway to the market, ownership and commercial incentives deserve scrutiny.
The debate gathered momentum after Adani Airport Holdings Ltd (AAHL) reportedly sought a waiver from contractual restrictions that could prevent it and its group entities from investing in, establishing or controlling a scheduled airline. However, later AAHL stated that they are not interested in operating an airline.
Be that as it may, the distinction between a contractual restriction and a general legal prohibition is important. The government has stated that there is no blanket policy preventing airport operators from owning airlines, although agreements governing certain privately operated airports contain relevant cross-ownership restrictions.
The 2009 study on Civil Aviation Sector Reforms by CUTS, done under a project of the corporate affairs ministry to draft a National Competition Policy, examined the effects of deregulation, airline entry, airport charges and regulatory arrangements. Its central lesson remains useful today: private participation and additional market players matter, but they are not ends in themselves.
The study also recognized that airport infrastructure and its costs can impact competition between airlines. This concern becomes more significant when an airport operator may also compete in the airline market.
An airport provides facilities and services that airlines need to operate. At a capacity-constrained airport, access to parking slots, gates and other facilities may be particularly important.
An operator with a related airline could have an incentive to favour its own airlines through preferential access, charges or services, or through access to commercially sensitive information about competitors.
That is a potential conflict of interest. The Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) 2019 decision concerning GMR Airports is relevant. In examining a combination involving investors associated with Tata Sons, which had interests in airline services, CCI also considered potential competition concerns arising from vertical relationships involving airport infrastructure.
It identified possible foreclosure risks and approved the combination subject to voluntary modifications addressing concerns that included preferential slot allocation and competitive neutrality. This shows that airport-related vertical relationships can raise legitimate competition concerns.
The task now is to assess the proposed arrangement on its own merits: the airport’s market power, the ownership structure, the incentives to favour an affiliated airline and the capacity of regulators to detect discriminatory conduct.
Supporters of relaxation in the restrictions argue that airport operators entering the airline market could attract investment, create another carrier and expand connectivity. These are legitimate, but universal, objectives. A new airline does not necessarily mean stronger competition.
Its impact depends on whether it constrains existing carriers, enters underserved routes and competes on its merits rather than through advantages derived from control over airport infrastructure.
Equally, the possibility of discrimination should not automatically rule out every ownership arrangement. The government should ask what efficiencies are likely, whether they can be quantified and whether similar gains could be achieved through less restrictive arrangements.
If ownership is permitted, safeguards must be enforceable, and not be mere promises on paper. These could include transparent and non-discriminatory access rules, independently verifiable slot-allocation processes, clear criteria for charges, and independent oversight.
Crucially, the effects should be measured. Changes in fares, flight frequency, service quality and access to airport facilities would help establish whether the anticipated benefits materialize and whether competition is being weakened.
India needs investment in aviation infrastructure and effective competition among airlines. The two objectives can coexist, but neither should be assumed to guarantee the other.
The authors are, respectively, secretary general and assistant director, CUTS International.
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